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THERE IS NO BASIS FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN THIS ACTION. 
This Court in its MEMORANDUM DECISION at page 2, stated the following: 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
Walsh challenges the trial court's award of prejudgment interest. A trial court's 
award of prejudgment interest presents a question of law that we review for 
correctness. Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah App. 
1993). Prejudgment interest is appropriately awarded if the damages can be fixed at a 
particular time and calculated with mathematical certainty. Shoreline Development, 
Inc. v. Utah County. 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App 1992). This is clearly a case in 
which damages are calculable with mathematical precision and prejudgment interest is 
properly awarded. Erickson's damages merely reimburse her for the tendered purchase 
price of Walsh's unsalable interest in the partnership for which she received nothing. 
Robinson and Van Alstyne's damages represent Walsh's liability for one half of the 
partnership debts. Walsh's liability in this regard is easily calculated by subtracting 
the proceeds from the sale of business assets from the existing debts, and dividing the 
amount in half. The information necessary to make these calculations was within the 
control of Walsh. We therefore affirm the trial court's award of prejudgment interest. 
This Court is absolutely correct in the citations to the two cases of Andreason 
vs. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.. 848 P.2d 171 (Utah App. 1993) and Shoreline 
Development, Inc. vs. Utah County. 835 P.2d 207, (Utah App. 1992), however 
Appellant respectfully submits that the analysis and holdings justify there by no 
prejudgment interest, rather than the other way around. Appellant includes a copy of 
each of the cases in the addendum. 
In the case of Andreason. this Court stated on page 177 as follows: 
In their cross-appeal, plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in not awarding 
them prejudgment interest on the jury's damages award. The trial court's decision on 
plaintiffs' entitlement to prejudgment interest presents a question of law which we 
review for correctness. Vali Convalescent & Care Insts. v. Division of Health Care 
Fin., 797 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah App. 1990); Hermes Assocs. v. Park's Sportsman, 813 
P.2d 1221
 y 1223 (Utah App. 1991). Consequently, "we need not accord any particular 
deference to the decisions below." Vali, 797 P.2d at 444 (citing Hurley v. Board of 
Review, 161 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988) (agency decision); Scharfv. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) (trial court decision)). 
Plaintiffs argue that by establishing the threshold facts of promise, reliance and 
damage, they created an entitlement to full compensation for their expenses, including 
interest on the money expended six years previously. According to plaintiffs, their 
right to full compensatory damages includes prejudgment interest as matter of law 
because (1) their damages were sufficiently fixed at the time that they incurred 
expenses to repair their home, and (2) prejudgment interest is appropriate because "the 
damages claimed were with reference to the value of the repair of damaged property." 
The Utah Supreme Court first discussed the rationale behind prejudgment 
interest in Fell v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1005-06 (1907). 
The Fell court stated that because awarding damages at law was intended to return a 
plaintiff to the status quo, prejudgment interest could be available where necessary to 
accomplish full compensation. Id. In Utah, prejudgment interest may be awarded in 
situations where the damage is complete, the loss can be measured by facts and 
figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time. Bjork v. April 
Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct 
2634, 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977). Although damages may be unliquidated, they must be 
calculable through a mathematically certain procedure allowing the court of the jury to 
fix the amount by following "fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value ... 
rather than be[ing] guided by their best judgment in assessing the amount" or 
evaluating elements lacking fixed standards by which to measure their value. Fell, 88 
P. at 1007; Price-Orem v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, 784 P.2d 475, 483 (Utah App. 
1989). If sufficient certainty exists, courts should allow interest from the time when 
damages became fixed, rather than from the date of the judgment. Bjork, 560 P.2d at 
317. However, "where 'damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province 
of the jury to assess at the time of trial,'" then prejudgment interest is inappropriate. 
Price-Orem, 784 P.2d at 483 (quoting Fell, 88 P. at 1006). 
Then again on page 178, this Court went on and stated: 
. . . . In assessing this amount, the fact finder is guided by its best judgment, not 
a known standard of value. . . . 
Furthermore, in contrast to a tort action for property damage, the recovery 
properly awarded under a promissory estoppel theory reflects the extent of reliance. To 
separate the damage for which defendant must accept responsibility from expenses 
which would have occurred in the absence of defendant's promise requires the 
determination of a fact-finder. Factual evaluation of this type lacks mathematical 
certainty prior to final determination and requires case by case analysis. When "the 
amount of the damage must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of the fact at the 
trial," prejudgment interest is inappropriate. Price-Orem, 784 P.2d at 482 (quoting 
#orA, 560 P.2d at 317). 
Then in Shoreline, this Court stated on page 211 as follows: 
The determining factor in awarding prejudgment interest is whether the 
damages upon which prejudgment interest is sought can be calculated with 
mathematical certainty. See, e.g., JackB. Parson Constr. Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 107, 
108-09 (Utah 1976) (amount due under the contract was ascertainable by calculation). 
"A court can award prejudgment interest only when the loss is fixed at a particular 
time and the amount can be fixed with accuracy." Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 
P„2d 1222, 1225 (Utah App.1990). If the jury must determine the loss by using its best 
judgment as to valuation rather than fixed standards of valuation, prejudgment interest 
is inappropriate, Id. See Bjorkv. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah) cert 
denied, 431 U.S. 930. 97 S.Ct. 2634, 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977) (where damages cannot 
be calculated with mathematical accuracy, the amount of the damage must be 
ascertained and assessed by the trier of fact and prejudgment interest is not allowed); 
Felly. UnionPac. Ry. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1006 (1907) ("In all. . . cases 
where the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province of the jury to 
assess at the time of the trial, no interest is permissible.") 
The Utah Supreme Court recently indicated that the lack of mathematical 
certainty generally prevents an award of prejudgment interest in equity claim. 
A survey of our cases where prejudgment interest was awarded indicates that 
interest has been allowed in actions for damage to personal property, in actions 
brought on a written contract and in an action to recover a liquidated over-payment of 
water subscription charges. In many of these cases, we stressed that the loss had been 
fixed as of a definite time and the amount of the loss can be calculated with 
mathematical accuracy in accordance with well-established rules of damages. No case 
has been cited to us where we have allowed prejudgment interest in an action such as 
the instant suit of this nature. , . invokes consideration of the principles of equity 
which address themselves to the conscience and discretion of the trial court." In view 
of the highly equitable nature of this action where the court has discretion in 
determining the amount, if any, to be [awarded to the plaintiff], we find no error in the 
denial of prejudgment interest. 
Appellant submits that had this been a case where the amounts had been 
ascertainable early on then prejudgment interest may well have been recoverable, 
however, there is absolutely no basis in the evidence to suggest that the amounts 
claimed by the Counter claimants (Appellees) were ever ascertainable, even through 
the end of trial. 
The first reason why this is so, is because the trier of fact had to determine 
appropriate setoffs to be applied to the claims made by the Appellees in this action. 
On page 46 of the Transcript, during the first day of testimony, Peter Van 
Alstyne testified as follows: (Note page 46 in Addendum) 
Q. And did you in fact distribute to her (Jude) some of the unsold assets of 
the partnership? 
A. Right. 
Again on pages 121 and 122, Peter Van Alstyne testified that he distributed 
personal property to Jude Erickson, to Gerald Robinson and to himself: (Note pages 
121 and 122 in the Addendum) 
Q. Okay. Then when you finally sold it the following June of '86, you said 
that you didn't sell all the assets, that some of the assets you kept and 
some you gave to Erickson. 
A. These are assets that Video U.S.A. did not want to buy. They could not 
use them. 
Q. What were they? 
A. Well, there was a T.V. and then some Beta movies that were damaged, 
and a video camera that was broken. And I think a cash register and 
some office supplies. Those, I gave to Jude. We purchased two video 
recorders. 
Q. Who is "we"? 
A. My wife and I. So, we made out a check and purchased the two video 
recorder. I took the T.V., because the video store had purchased out of 
my own pocket and I paid a carpet cleaning bill earlier that spring. And I 
reimbursed myself for that with some other supplies. 
Q. Let's move on to the proceeds from this contract of sale on June, '86, 
with Video U.S.A. 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). 
Q. Who received those proceeds? 
A. Well, Gerald and I. 
Q. The reason I'm asking is, I heard Mr. Crawley ask you, and Robinson 
had gotten all of the proceeds from that; is that true? 
A. Well, Fm sorry, no. I've taken Gerald and I've split them. I used my 
proceeds to pay my legal costs since Mark initiated this action against 
me. 
As noted in the Memorandum Decision, at page 2, this Court stated: 
Walsh's liability in this regard is easily calculated by subtracting the proceeds 
from the sale of business assets from the existing debts, and dividing the 
amount in half. The information necessary to make these calculations was 
within the control of Walsh. 
Appellant respectfully submits that this is absolutely not so for two reasons: 
(1) As noted above the lower Court first had to determine the setoffs of the 
personal property taken by each of the remaining principals, after the sale of the assets, 
and 
(2) The Appellees themselves did not ever ascertain the amounts they 
claimed to be due and owing, until they literally were preparing for trial in this matter. 
As to the first argument, it is unchallenged that the principals took substantial 
assets when the business was sold. As noted above, they each took items of personal 
property, and in the case of Peter Van Alstyne and Gerald Robinson, they each took 
cash in addition. 
These individuals surely can not take these items, and then double dip against 
Mr. Walsh, and claim that he must pay the remaining balance after the sale of the 
business. 
Even if these many items were of little value considered separately, still the 
lower Court had to determine the appropriate setoff that Appellant would be entitled 
to, in the aggregate, before the remaining amount that would be due and owing would 
be mathematically calculable. 
These setoffs for the many items of personal property taken of used 
merchandize, etc. were clearly not something that Appellant could have determined in 
advance of the trial itself, and hence the analysis of Andreason, is particularly 
appropriate. 
Furthermore, in contrast to a tort action for property damage, the recovery 
properly awarded under a promissory estoppel theory reflects the extent of reliance. To 
separate the damage for which defendant must accept responsibility from expenses 
which would have occurred in the absence of defendant's promise requires the 
determination of a fact-finder. Factual evaluation of this type lacks mathematical 
certainty prior to final determination and requires case by case analysis. When "the 
amount of the damage must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of the fact at the 
trial," prejudgment interest is inappropriate. Price-Orem, 784 P.2d at 482 (quoting 
#orJfc560P.2dat317). 
In Andreason this Court determined that even though certain items of personal 
property, and cabinets, appliances, etc. could be ascertained, the whole amount was 
still very much in question, because the lower Court had to decide what values would 
be allowed and which ones would not. 
This is particularly so in the case before this Court, as one can not determine 
what the setoffs were going to be for unidentified personal property which were 
admittedly received by each of the principals. 
Hence, the case law clearly stands for the notion that when the amount can be 
mathematically determined then prejudgment interest is appropriate but where it is not, 
then prejudgment interest is not appropriate. 
In this case, it was clearly the later, and hence no prejudgment interest would be 
allowed as a matter of law. 
As to the second point, that the Appellees themselves did not ever ascertain the 
amounts they claimed to be due and owing until they literally were preparing for trial, 
is born out on page 312 of the transcript for April 25, 1989, which is included in the 
addendum. 
Appellees had submitted inconsistent testimony on what the principal amount 
was due, and then Peter Van Alstyne states to his own attorney: 
Q. Which one is right, this one or the one Mary Ann prepared? 
A. I prepared this just as a general ballpark when I was consulting with you 
as to what at the very least would be the outstanding debt that I am in the hole, out 
these dollar amounts. At the very least. I didn't really work into any consideration 
with respect to interest accruing there. I was just trying to get a general idea. 
It is not only clear that the Appellees themselves did not ascertain what amounts 
they were claiming prior to trial, even the Judge after all of the evidence was in, asked 
for clarification from the Appellees as to what amounts they claimed were due and 
owing. As noted on page 313 of the Transcript for April 25, 1989, Judge Moffat made 
the following comment after the trial was over, and he was taking the matter under 
advisement. (Note the same in the addendum) 
THE JUDGE: I would like a road map. I think it's as I said in chambers, 
it's fairly clear as to the position of the plaintiff in relation to the relief sought. Fm not 
now that clear in relation to the dollar and cents on the claim for relief under the 
counterclaim, because the evidence has altered it somewhat from the claims as set 
forth in the pleadings but as to the plaintiffs claim that there is a change or alteration 
in those figures, I would like there to be all the evidence out and in the open to tell me 
what our bottom line is. 
Hence, Appellant respectfully submits that the amounts claimed to be owed by 
the Appellees was anything but mathematically calculable. 
Hence, there is absolutely no basis for prejudgment interest in this action. 
Lastly, this Court makes a certain point in its MEMORANDUM DECISION, 
that bears special consideration. 
This Court stated, "The information necessary to make these calculations was 
within the control of Walsh." 
Appellant respectfully submits that, even should this Court completely disregard 
all of the arguments stated above, there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that this 
statement of fact, can ever be born out in the record. 
The record on the other hand states that this information was in fact never 
disclosed or otherwise made available to Mr. Walsh. Note page 46 of the Transcript, 
which is included in the addendum, wherein Mr. Van Alstyne stated: 
Q. Mr. Van Alstyne, you testified that you did not confer with Mr. Walsh 
about the sale of the business beginning in the Fall of 1985, is that 
correct? 
A. Yeah. 
Appellant respectfully submits that there is absolutely no basis for an award of 
prejudgment interest. 
Appellant respectfully submits that this determination is a critical one to him, in 
light of this fact that the total judgment is reduced by the sum of $12,515.22 should 
this Court disallow prejudgment interest, as well as the post judgment interest on the 
same. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully prays that this Court will carefully consider the law as 
outlined so clearly by this Court in the two cases cited in the MEMORANDUM 
DECISION, which are included in the addendum. 
It can not be disputed that there was absolutely no way for the Appellant to 
ascertain the amount due to the Appellees, as they themselves stated under oath that 
they had not even determined the same until they were preparing for trial, and then 
even during the trial they changed their position, and as noted by Judge Moffat, he 
could not follow what their bottomline was, and requested assistance of Counsel to 
clarify. 
Lastly, even if this Court does not change its prior ruling regarding prejudgment 
interest, it can not be said that this appeal is without merit, and Appellant respectfully 
requests that no attorneys fees on appeal be allowed. 
Hence, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse on the issue of 
prejudgment interest, and remand the matter to the District Court to determine the 
amounts owing in the judgment, with no award of Attorneys fees on appeal. Counsel 
for the Plaintiff hereby certifies that this Petition is presented in good faith and not for 
delay. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of April, 1995 
1/ M. 
JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING, to the Defendants, by mailing the same in 
the United States Mail, addressed to JOYCE MAUGHN, 455 SOUTH 300 EAST, 
THIRD FLOOR, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84111, dated this 19th day of April, 
1995. 
)RNEY AT LAW 
SHORELINE DEVELOPMENT, INC. v. UTAH COUNTY Utah 207 
Cite at 835 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1992) 
vices in aiding county in obtaining dredge 
was supported by sufficient evidence, even 
though county never made use of dredge 
pumps after removing them from dredge 
because it was unable to find way to retro-
fit dredging pumps for use; county failed 
to marshal evidence in support of $94,000 
award, but only marshaled evidence show-
ing efforts of agent and attempted to coun-
ter evidence with some evidence of efforts 
expended by county and state, in apparent 
attempt to show that agent was not sole 
party involved in obtaining dredge. 
SHORELINE DEVELOPMENT, INC., a 
Utah corporation, Milton Jones, and 
Milton Hanks, Plaintiffs, Appellees, 
and Cross-Appellants, 
UTAH COUNTY and American Fork 
City, Defendant, Appellant, and 
Cross-Appellee. 
No. 910241-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 10, 1992. 
Alleged agent brought suit against 
county for services rendered in obtaining 
dredging pumps intended to be used by 
county on lake. The Fourth District Court, 
Utah County, George E. Ballif, J., entered 
judgment on jury verdict in favor of agent 
on unjust enrichment claim. County ap-
pealed and agent cross appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Bench, P.J., held that: 
(1) claim for unjust enrichment was an 
equitable claim not barred by the Govern-
mental Immunity Act, and (2) agent was 
not entitled to award of prejudgment inter-
est. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error <3=>173(2) 
County's claim that corporate powers 
of county statute barred claim by alleged 
agent for unjust enrichment as result of its 
services in aiding county in obtaining 
dredge, which claim was not raised at trial, 
would not be considered for first time on 
appeal. U.C.A.1953, 17-4-5. 
2. Counties <3=»208 
Claim against county by agent for un-
just enrichment arising from its services in 
aiding county to obtain dredge was an eq-
uitable claim not barred by the Governmen-
tal Immunity Act, despite county's conten-
tion that it was acting in effort to control 
flooding. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-3. 
3. Counties <3=>223 
Jury's finding that county received 
benefit of $94,000, as result of agent's ser-
835 P.26—7 
4. Trial <S=>307(3) 
Trial court was not required to grant 
requests by jury during deliberations that 
deposition of witness, who had been un-
available to testify at trial, and whose depo-
sition had been read to jury, be sent to jury 
room. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 47(m). 
5. Interest <£=>39(2.20) 
Agent, which obtained unjust enrich-
ment award from county for agent's servic-
es in obtaining dredge, was not entitled to 
award of prejudgment interest; jury had 
discretion to award interest as part of equi-
ty judgment, so that there was risk of 
double recovery. 
6. Interest <s=>39(2.15) 
Determining factor in awarding pre-
judgment interest is whether damages 
upon which interest is sought can be calcu-
lated with mathematical certainty. 
7. Interest <s=»39(2.15) 
If jury must determine loss by using 
its best judgment as to valuation rather 
than fixed standards of valuation, prejudg-
ment interest is inappropriate. 
8. Interest <s=>39(2.20) 
Prejudgment interest must be sought 
directly as damages in unjust enrichment 
cases, if at all, and may not be subsequent-
ly added by trial court to jury's award for 
unjust enrichment. 
Kay Bryson and Jeril B. Wilson, Provo, 
for appellant. 
Gregory J. Sanders, Salt Lake City, for 
appellees. 
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Before BENCH, BILLINGS and 
RUSSON, JJ. 
AMENDED OPINION ON 
REHEARING * 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Shoreline Development, Inc., brought 
suit against Utah County for services ren-
dered by Shoreline in obtaining dredging 
pumps intended to be used by the County 
on Utah Lake. The trial court entered a 
partial directed verdict in the County's fa-
vor dismissing Shoreline's contract claims. 
Shoreline's unjust enrichment claim, how-
ever, was sent to the jury. The jury found 
in Shoreline's favor and awarded it $94,000 
for the services rendered. The County ap-
peals and Shoreline cross-appeals. We af-
firm. 
FACTS 
In 1985, Shoreline entered into an agree-
ment with American Fork City l to operate 
a boat harbor the City owned on Utah 
Lake, which is located in Utah County. It 
was determined that a dredge was neces-
sary to develop the harbor. Shoreline be-
gan to investigate ways of obtaining a 
dredge and ended up working with William 
Arseneau, the Director of State Surplus 
Property. They identified certain surplus 
federal government dredges that could be 
released for use on this project. The prin-
cipals of Shoreline spent many hours work-
ing on the project in 1985. Beginning in 
the early part of 1986, they were each 
working on the project an estimated 50 to 
60 hours per week. 
In mid-March, 1986, a meeting was held 
with the Utah County Commission to dis-
cuss the work being done by Shoreline for 
American Fork. All three of the county 
commissioners attended, as well as Clyde 
Naylor, the county engineer. During the 
meeting, Shoreline outlined a proposal 
whereby it would obtain a dredge for the 
County and be given the exclusive rights to 
operate it on Utah Lake. Shoreline indi-
cated it was focusing its efforts upon the 
* Replaces this court's opinion of the same name 
filed on May 19, 1992 (187 Utah Adv.Rep. 26). 
dredge "Harding" which belonged to the 
Army Corps of Engineers and was located 
in Portland, Oregon. The dredge had two 
large dredging pumps that could be sal-
vaged for the County. The Commission 
took a voice vote and authorized expendi-
ture of $2,000 to get the project going. 
Immediately after the meeting, Shoreline 
prepared a letter memorializing the agree-
ment that had been reached with the com-
missioners. That letter was hand carried 
to the Commission the next day. When the 
written memorialization of the agreement 
was delivered, a check for $2,000 was given 
to Shoreline. No express written contract 
was executed by the parties. 
Shoreline then moved forward under the 
understanding it had an agreement with 
the County to obtain a dredge and set up 
business operations on Utah Lake. Shore-
line presented the County with written re-
ports concerning its investigation. Shore-
line again met with two of the county com-
missioners to discuss the project in general, 
and the dredge Harding in particular. 
Shoreline claims that the commissioners 
again took an express oral vote and specifi-
cally authorized Shoreline to proceed with 
obtaining a dredge for the County. One of 
the principals of Shoreline remembers a 
commissioner specifically stating that no 
bid process was required in order for the 
agreement to be made. 
After this second meeting with the com-
missioners, Shoreline continued to work to-
wards obtaining the dredging pumps off 
the Harding for the County. In early June 
of 1986, it became known that the dredging 
pumps were going to make it to Utah. The 
principals of Shoreline then met with the 
county commissioners and other officials, 
including the mayor of American Fork. 
They were totally surprised in that meeting 
when the commissioners thanked them for 
their efforts in obtaining the dredging 
pumps and then told them that there was 
no deal in place. One of the commissioners 
suggested that Shoreline submit a bill. 
1. American Fork has settled with Shoreline and 
is not a party to this appeal. 
SHORELINE DEVELOPMENT, INC. v. UTAH COUNTY Utah 209 
Cite as 835 PJid 207 (Utah App. 1992) 
After Shoreline had been excused from 
the deal, the government paperwork was 
completed and the dredging pumps were 
delivered to the County. The county's en-
gineer signed one document acknowledging 
that the value of the dredge was $6,022,-
563. County commissioner Gary Anderson, 
in accepting the dredge, also signed a doc-
ument acknowledging its value at $6,022,-
563. 
Shoreline presented a bill for $250,000 to 
the County for the value of its services in 
obtaining the dredge. The County refused 
to pay the bill and Shoreline brought suit. 
Shoreline claimed the County was liable 
under an express contractual agreement 
that Shoreline would obtain a dredge for 
the County. In the alternative, Shoreline 
claimed that if there was no express con-
tract, the County was liable under an im-
plied-in-fact contract as evidenced by the 
work actually performed by Shoreline. As 
a final alternative, Shoreline claimed that 
the County was liable for the unjust enrich-
ment it received from Shoreline's efforts. 
At the close of Shoreline's evidence, the 
County moved for a directed verdict as to 
the express contract and the implied-in-fact 
contract claims. The County argued that it 
was protected from any contractual claims 
because it did not act in accordance with 
state code or its own customary practices 
in dealing with Shoreline and therefore it 
could not be bound by those acts. The 
County conceded at that time that the un-
just enrichment claim could properly be 
presented to the jury. The trial court 
agreed and granted a directed verdict in 
favor of the County on Shoreline's first two 
claims. The County then rested, without 
putting on any case of its own, and the 
unjust enrichment claim was sent to the 
jury. The jury awarded Shoreline $94,000 
for services rendered. Shoreline then re-
2. The Governmental Immunity Act has since 
been amended, but without change to the rele-
vant language. See section 63-30-3(3) (Supp. 
1991). 
3. Shoreline also cross-appeals the dismissal of 
its contract claims but only requests that we 
address these issues if we reverse the unjust 
enrichment award. Inasmuch as we affirm the 
quested prejudgment interest on the $94,-
000, but the trial court denied the request. 
The County appeals, claiming it is shield-
ed from the unjust enrichment claim by 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-4-5 (1991) (corporate 
powers of a county), and by Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-3 (1989) (the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act).2 The County also 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
as to whether it received a benefit from 
Shoreline's efforts. And finally, the Coun-
ty claims that the trial court erred in re-
fusing to allow the jury to take into the 
jury room a deposition that had been read 
into evidence. Shoreline cross-appeals the 
denial of prejudgment interest, claiming 




[1] The County asserts that Shoreline's 
unjust enrichment claim is precluded by 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-4-5 (1991). This de-
fense was not raised below. We will not 
address issues raised for the first time on 
appeal. See Zions First Nat. Bank v. Na-
tional Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 
654 (Utah 1988). 
[2] The County also asserts that Shore-
line's unjust enrichment claim is barred by 
the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1989), because the 
County was acting in an effort to control 
flooding. The supreme court has clearly 
held that "[governmental immunity may 
not be used as a defense to equitable 
claims " Board of Educ. of Granite 
School Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 
1030, 1036 (Utah 1983) (quantum meruit 
claim upheld where county "acquiesced in 
the receipt of the benefit").4 Shoreline's 
judgment, we need not address the trial court's 
legal conclusions as to the first two claims. 
4. See, e.g., Concrete Products Co. v. Salt Lake 
County, 734 P.2d 910, 911-12 (Utah 1987) (quan-
tum meruit claim was recognized as permissi-
ble, but claim failed for lack of evidence that 
county was directly benefitted); Breitling Bros. 
Constr., Inc. v. Utah Golden Spikers, Inc., 597 
P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 1979) (remanded for further 
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unjust enrichment claim is therefore not 
barred by the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
[3] The County challenges the sufficien-
cy of the evidence to support a finding that 
the County received a benefit in the 
amount of $94,000. In particular, the 
County argues that the benefit of Shore-
line's services could not have been $94,000 
because the County received no "net bene-
fit" from obtaining the dredge. After the 
dredging pumps were removed from the 
dredge, the County never made use of 
them. The County argues that it was sim-
ply unable to find a way to retrofit the 
dredging pumps for use on Utah Lake. In 
fact, the federal government ultimately re-
possessed them. The County errs, how-
ever, in focusing on the "net benefit" of 
the entire transaction. The appropriate 
benefit upon which Shoreline's unjust en-
richment claim is based, and upon which 
damages must be awarded, is the service 
rendered by Shoreline in obtaining the 
dredge. The fact that following the receipt 
of this benefit the County was unsuccess-
ful in making a profitable use of the 
dredge is immaterial to the valuation of 
Shoreline's services. The County, not 
Shoreline, bore the risk the venture might 
fail. 
The County has failed to satisfy its bur-
den of marshaling the evidence in support 
of the jury's holding that it received a 
benefit worth $94,000. Hodges v. Gibson 
Prod. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991) 
(appellant must set out all evidence that 
supports jury verdict, including all valid 
inferences, and demonstrate "that reason-
able persons would not conclude that the 
evidence supports the verdict"). The Coun-
ty does marshal the evidence showing the 
efforts of Shoreline and attempts to coun-
ter it with some evidence of the efforts 
expended by the County and the State in an 
proceedings regarding quantum meruit claim 
against the state when trial court dissuaded 
plaintiff from presenting claim). 
5. Rule 47(m) provides, in relevant part and with 
our emphasis, "[u]pon retiring for deliberation 
the jury may take with them the instructions of 
the court and all exhibits and all papers which 
apparent attempt to show that Shoreline 
was not the sole party involved in obtaining 
the dredge. The primary focus of the 
County's marshaling, however, is on wheth-
er it received any "net benefit" from the 
venture. The County has not marshaled 
the evidence in support of the $94,000 
award. Nowhere in the County's attempt 
to marshal is there any indication that the 
services rendered in obtaining the dredge 
were not worth $94,000. We therefore do 
not disturb the jury award. See, e.g., State 
v. Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah 
App.1990) (when appellant fails to marshal, 
reviewing court presumes that the holding 
is adequately supported by the clear weight 
of the evidence). 
DEPOSITION 
[4] During its deliberations, the jury re-
quested that the deposition of William Ar-
seneau be sent into the jury room. Due to 
the unavailability of Arseneau, his deposi-
tion had been read in its entirety to the 
jury during the trial. The trial court re-
fused to allow the deposition to be sent to 
the jury room because Arseneau's written 
testimony might receive more weight than 
other oral testimony. The County argues 
that the trial court erred in not allowing 
the jury to review the deposition. 
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
47(m), the jury may not take depositions 
with them when they deliberate.5 The 
question of whether written testimony 
should be allowed in the jury room has 
already been addressed in State v. Solo-
mon, 96 Utah 500, 87 P.2d 807, 811 (1939), 
wherein the supreme court held: "The law 
does not permit depositions or witnesses to 
go to the jury room." 6 
In light of Rule 47(m) and the supreme 
court's unequivocal holding that deposi-
tions are not permitted in the jury room, 
we find no error. 
have been received as evidence in the cause, 
except depositions " 
6. The supreme court reaffirmed its holding in 
Solomon in State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 14-15 
(Utah 1984). 
SHORELINE DEVELOPMENT, INC. v. UTAH COUNTY Utah 211 
Cite as 835 P.2d 207 (UtahApp. 1992) 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
[5] In its cross-appeal, Shoreline chal-
lenges the trial court's refusal to award 
prejudgment interest on the $94,000 unjust 
enrichment award. Shoreline asserts that 
prejudgment interest should be available 
because an unjust enrichment claim falls 
somewhere between the poles of express 
contract claims, where prejudgment inter-
est is often allowed, and tort claims, where 
prejudgment interest is seldom allowed. In 
particular, Shoreline asserts that the sim-
ilarity between an unjust enrichment claim 
and a contract claim weighs in favor of 
awarding prejudgment interest. Shore-
line's reliance on the nature of the claim, 
however, is misplaced. 
[6, 71 The determining factor in award-
ing prejudgment interest is whether the 
damages upon which prejudgment interest 
is sought can be calculated with mathemat-
ical certainty. See, e.g., Jack B. Parson 
Constr. Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 107, 108-09 
(Utah 1976) (amount due under the contract 
was ascertainable by calculation). "A 
court can award prejudgment interest only 
when the loss is fixed at a particular time 
,and the amount can be fixed with accura-
cy." Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 
P.2d 1222, 1225 (Utah App.1990). If the 
jury must determine the loss by using its 
best judgment as to valuation rather than 
fixed standards of valuation, prejudgment 
interest is inappropriate. Id. See Bjork v. 
April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah) 
cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct. 2634, 53 
L.Ed.2d 245 (1977) (where damages cannot 
be calculated with mathematical accuracy, 
the amount of the damage must be ascer-
tained and assessed by the trier of fact and 
prejudgment interest is not allowed); Fell 
v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 
1003, 1006 (1907) ("In,all . . . cases where 
the damages are incomplete and are pecu-
liarly within the province of the jury to 
assess at the time of the trial, no interest is 
^e^missible^'). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently indi-
cated that the lack of mathematical certain-
ty generally prevents an award of prejudg-
ment interest in equity claims. 
A survey of our cases where prejudg-
ment interest was awarded indicates that 
interest has been allowed in actions for 
damage to personal property, in actions 
brought on a written contract, and in an 
action to recover a liquidated over-
payment of water subscription charges. 
In many of these cases, we stressed that 
the loss had been fixed as of a definite 
time and the amount of the loss can be 
calculated with mathematical accuracy in 
accordance with well-established rules of 
damages. No case has been cited to us 
where we have allowed prejudgment in-
terest in an action such as the instant 
case, which is for equitable relief. "A 
suit of this nature . . . invokes considera-
tion of the principles of equity which 
address themselves to the conscience and 
discretion of the trial court." In view of 
the high)y equitable nature of this action 
where the court has discretion in deter-
mining the amount, if any, to be [award-
ed to the plaintiff], we find no error in 
the denial of prejudgment interest. 
Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 
(Utah 1991) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606, 610 (Utah 
1976)). 
Shoreline asserts that there is a public 
policy ground for awarding interest in equi-
ty cases despite the uncertainty of the dam-
ages. While we recognize Shoreline's con-
cern that injured parties be made whole, 
we find that this concern is adequately 
addressed by reason of the fact that equity 
plaintiffs may claim lost interest as part of 
their damages. Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. 
White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885, 887 
(Utah 1976) (where justice and equity re-
quire, interest may he awarded as part of 
the damages). Since a jury has discretion 
to award interest as part of an equity judg-
ment, there is a risk of double recovery if 
prejudgment interest may be added to a 
jury's equity award by the trial court who 
does not know whether the jury's award 
covers interest. In order to prevent such 
double recovery, we presume that if the 
claimant was entitled to any interest, it was 
awarded by the jury as part of the equity 
award. 
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[8] Given the risk of double recovery, 
and in light of the supreme court's ruling 
in Bellon, we hold that prejudgment inter-
est must be sought directly as damages in 
unjust enrichment cases, if at all. Prejudg-
ment interest may not be subsequently 
added by a trial court to a jury's award for 
unjust enrichment. We therefore find no 
error in the trial court's refusal to award 
Shoreline prejudgment interest on the $94,-
000 judgment awarded by the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
As to the County's appeal of the judg-
ment for unjust enrichment, the County 
failed to raise its statutory defense below 
so we do not address it for the first time or 
appeal. Furthermore, the county may noi 
raise governmental immunity as a defense 
against an equitable claim for unjust en 
richment. As to the assertion that the tria 
court erred in refusing to allow the deposi 
tion in the jury room, we find no error. As 
to Shoreline's cross-appeal requesting pre-
judgment interest, we also find no error, 
The judgment is therefore affirmed. 
BILLINGS and RUSSON, JJ., concur. 
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rably harmed by the violation, the viola-
tion was innocent, defendants' cost of 
removal would be disproportionate and 
oppressive compared to the benefits 
plaintiffs would derive from it, and plain-
tiffs can be compensated by damages. 
Id. (citing Papanikolas Bros. Ent. v. Sug-
arhouse Shopping Ctr. Ass'n, 535 P.2d 
1256 (Utah 1975)),, 
[14] In this case, we find that substan-
tial evidence relevant to this criteria sup-
ports the trial court's decision to refuse to 
order the removal of the McNeils' en-
croachment. Plaintiffs' actions and ad-
vance notice indicate that they would not 
be irreparably harmed by the encroach-
ment. Their predecessors in interest will-
ingly purchased Lots 12 and 13 with the 
understanding that the lots extended only 
to the center line of the river, and plaintiffs 
made their offer to purchase with that 
same understanding. On the other hand, 
the McNeils are innocent possessors of the 
encroaching residence who neither con-
structed the house nor knew of its en-
croachment at the time of their purchase. 
While their home would be greatly dam-
aged or totally destroyed by removal, plain-
tiffs' intended use and enjoyment of the 
undisputed remainder of the property 
would not be significantly hindered by al-
lowing the encroachment to remain. Based 
on this evidence, we find that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in deter-
mining that the balance of equities weighed 
in favor of compensating plaintiffs through 
damages for the loss of the disputed piece 
of land. 
Plaintiffs also claim that if equity would 
not require the removal of the McNeils' 
home, the trial court still erred by allocat-
ing the entire disputed portion to them. 
Plaintiffs claim that the court acted arbi-
trarily in returning the boundary line to the 
center of the Santa Clara River and errone-
ously neglected to consider what portion of 
plaintiffs' disputed real property was actu-
ally necessary to accommodate the 
McNeils' encroachment. We note, howev-
er, that plaintiffs' own expert provided the 
calculation of the square feet occupied by 
the McNeils' encroachment and that plain-
tiffs offered no evidence regarding any 
lesser portion of land for the court's consid-
eration. It was, therefore, within the trial 
court's discretion to use plaintiffs' expert's 
testimony in determining what segment of 
land should remain with the McNeils. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law, the trial court did not 
err in considering the Santa Clara River an 
adequate monument for purposes of bound-
ary by acquiescence. Because the Zanes 
presented sufficient evidence to meet all 
elements of that doctrine, the court did not 
abuse its discretion in quieting title of the 
disputed land in their favor. It also acted 
within its discretion in refusing to require 
the removal of the McNeils' encroachment 
and then awarding plaintiffs damages to 
compensate them for the land whose title 
the court ordered quieted in the McNeils. 
We affirm. 
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
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Derek ANDREASON and Dana An-
dreason, Plaintiffs, Appellees, 
and Cross-Appellants, 
v. 
AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COM-
PANY, Defendant, Appellant, and 
Cross-Appellee. 
No. 910615-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 18, 1993. 
Homeowners whose property was dam-
aged by fire brought action against insur-
er, seeking to recover damages based upon 
promissory estoppel theory. The District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Anne M. Stirba, 
J., following jury's award of damages, re-
fused to subject award to remittitur or 
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order new trial, but also refused to grant 
prejudgment interest. On cross appeals, 
the Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held 
that: (1) homeowners presented sufficient 
evidence to allow jury to determine their 
entitlement to promissory estoppel dam-
ages and to calculate value of damages, 
and denial of new trial or remittitur was 
not unreasonable, but (2) even if plaintiffs' 
recordation of expenses accurately reflects 
value.of their personal expenditures, it 
does not provide known standard of value 
for measuring damages in promissory es-
toppel case, as required for award of pre-
judgment interest. 
Affirmed. 
Orme, J., concurred in result only. 
1. Jury 0=14(1) 
"Promissory estoppel" is equitable 
claim for relief which is normally tried to 
bench. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. New Trial <3=76(1) 
Damage assessment is peculiarly jury 
function and, thus, trial courts should exer-
cise caution in setting aside verdict and 
ordering new trial on basis of excessive 
damages. 
3. New Trial <®=>76(1) 
Trial court enjoys broad discretion in 
deciding whether to set aside verdict and 
order new trial on basis of excessive dam-
ages, as long as its grounds for granting 
remittitur or new trial fit one of seven 
specified in rule. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 59. 
4. New Trial <®=>74, 77(1) 
Trial court should review propriety of 
damages award and grant new trial only 
where it is obvious that jury lacked reason-
able basis for its decision, acted with preju-
dice or passion, or disregarded competent 
evidence. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59. 
5. Estoppel <s=>85 
Promissory estoppel claim should not 
fail for lack of damages on sole basis that 
plaintiffs received benefit. 
6. Estoppel <s=*118 
Homeowners presented sufficient evi-
dence to allow jury to determine their enti-
tlement to promissory estoppel damages 
and to calculate value of damages in action 
against insurer which had misrepresented 
that policy covered fire damage, and denial 
of new trial or remittitur was not unreason-
able; there was evidence from which jury 
could reasonably infer that adhering to in-
surer's plan of immediate professional re-
pair required homeowners to forego their 
option of gradual self-help and necessitated 
additional expenses, and allocation of ap-
proximately 90% of homeowner's expenses 
as extent of damages due to detrimental 
reliance was not contrary to law. 
7. Damages <^184 
Award of damages required that plain-
tiff prove fact of damages by preponder-
ance of evidence and amount of damages 
by approximations and projections that rise 
above mere speculation. 
8. Appeal and Error <s*842(ll) 
Trial court's decision on plaintiffs' enti-
tlement to prejudgment interest presented 
question of law which appellate court re-
viewed for correctness. 
9. Interest <s=>39(2.15) 
Prejudgment interest may be awarded 
in situations where damage is complete, 
loss can be measured by facts and figures, 
and amount of loss is fixed as of particular 
time. 
10. Interest <S=>39(2.15) 
Although prejudgment interest may be 
awarded even if damages are unliquidated, 
damages must be calculable through math-
ematically certain procedure allowing court 
or jury to fix amount by following fixed 
rules of evidence and known standards of 
value, rather than being guided by their 
best judgment in assessing amount or eval-
uating elements lacking fixed standards by 
which to measure their value. 
11. Interest <®=»39(1) 
If sufficient certainty exists, courts 
should allow interest from time when dam-
ages became fixed, rather than from date 
of judgment. 
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12. Interest <3=>39(2.20) 
Even if plaintiffs' recordation of ex-
penses accurately reflects value of their 
personal expenditures, it does not provide 
known standard of value for measuring 
damages in promissory estoppel case, as 
required for award of prejudgment inter-
est; rather, damage assessment requires 
fact finder's case by case calculation of 
value of detrimental reliance on promise 
and, in assessing amount of damages, fact 
finder is guided by its best judgment, not 
known standard of value. 
Michael P. Zaccheo, Salt Lake City, for 
appellant. 
Wayne B. Watson and Thomas J. Scrib-
ner, Provo, for appellees. 
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD and 
ORME, JJ. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Company appeals a jury verdict awarding 
plaintiffs, Dana and Derek Andreason, 
damages based upon a promissory estoppel 
theory. On appeal, defendant claims that 
the trial court abused its discretion in re-
fusing 'o either subject the jury award to 
remittitur or order a new trial. Plaintiffs 
cross-appeal, claiming that the trial court 
erred a^  a matter of law in refusing to 
grant them prejudgment interest on the 
jury award. We affirm the trial court's 
decision upholding the jury award without 
prejudgment interest. 
BACKGROUND 
Because the parties tried this case before 
a jury, we recite the facts in a light favor-
able to the jury verdict. State v. Perdue, 
813 P.2d 1201, 1202 (Utah App.1991). On 
April 4, 1986, a fire extensively damaged 
plaintiffs' kitchen and garage, and caused 
smoke, electrical, and water damage 
throughout their home. Immediately after 
the fire and for the three weeks following, 
defendant's agents mistakenly represented 
to plaintiffs that their fire losses would be 
covered by their insurance policy with de-
fendant. A week after the fire, defen-
dant's adjuster visited plaintiffs' burned 
home, instructed them on repairs, and au-
thorized them to proceed. Plaintiffs imme-
diately began extensive clean up and repair 
work consistent with the adjuster's instruc-
tions. 
After three weeks, defendant discovered 
that it no longer insured plaintiffs because 
their fire insurance policy had been can-
celed six weeks prior to the fire. When 
defendant belatedly denied insurance cover-
age for their fire losses, plaintiffs sued. 
In May 1991, plaintiffs' suit against de-
fendant went to trial. The trial court had 
previously granted defendant a partial 
summary judgment, concluding that the in-
surance contract was canceled prior to the 
fire. The trial, therefore, continued solely 
on plaintiffs' promissory estoppel theory. 
During the trial, plaintiff Derek Andreason 
testified in detail about the extent, nature, 
and timing of the home repairs. He stated 
that he undertook $41,957.69 worth of 
work, and that he did "all of the work" in 
detrimental reliance on defendant's prom-
ise of coverage. Mr. Andreason testified 
that defendant's agent provided detailed 
instructions on repairs and replacements 
that should be undertaken. For example, 
according to Mr. Andreason, the agent told 
him not to consider repairing some items, 
but to simply discard them and purchase 
new ones. These items included the living 
room carpet, the kitchen range, kitchen 
cabinets, a cedar wall, and the tile floor. 
Mr. Andreason claimed that without the 
promise of insurance coverage, he would 
have boarded up his home, gradually done 
the work himself, and repaired rather than 
replaced many items. By the time defen-
dant repudiated its promise of coverage, 
however, repair work had proceeded be-
yond the point where plaintiffs' self-help 
plan was an option. The jury awarded 
plaintiffs damages of $37,500.00. 
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial 
or remittitur and objected to plaintiffs' re-
quest for prejudgment interest from the 
date they originally demanded payment for 
their repair costs. The trial court denied 
defendant's motion and issued a judgment 
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for plaintiffs without awarding prejudg-
ment interest. This appeal followed. 
ANALYSIS 
Both defendant's appeal, seeking to va-
cate the jury award, and plaintiffs' cross-
appeal, seeking to increase the award to 
include prejudgment interest, present is-
sues related to the nature of damages in 
promissory estoppel. Defendant asks this 
court to determine whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to grant 
its motion for remittitur or a new trial, 
claiming that the damages awarded were 
excessive or unwarranted. On cross-ap-
peal, plaintiffs question whether the trial 
court erred as a matter of law in failing to 
award them prejudgment interest, arguing 
that without prejudgment interest, their 
damage recovery was incomplete. 
Promissory Estoppel 
[1] Promissory estoppel is an equitable 
claim for relief which is normally tried to 
the bench. See Tolboe Constr. v. Staker 
Paving & Constr., 682 P.2d 843, 849 (Utah 
1984). The parties in this case apparently 
agreed to present their case to the jury. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorize 
the jury to act as a factfinder in an equity 
action. "In all actions not triable of right 
by a jury the court upon motion or of its 
own initiative may try any issue with an 
advisory jury or, with the consent of both 
parties, may order a trial with a jury whose 
verdict has the same effect as if trial by 
jury had been a matter of right." Utah 
R.Civ.P. 39(c); see Willard M. Milne Inv. 
Co. v. Cox, 580 P.2d 607, 609 (Utah 1978). 
Because the jury properly heard this prom-
issory estoppel case, we need only deter-
mine if the trial court abused its discretion 
in refusing to grant a remittitur or a new 
trial. See Crooks ton v. Fire Ins. Exch., 
817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 1991). 
[2-4] Because damage assessment is 
peculiarly a jury function, trial courts 
should exercise caution in setting aside a 
verdict and ordering a new trial on the 
basis of excessive damages. Batty v. 
Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1978). 
A trial court enjoys broad discretion in this 
decision, as long as its grounds for grant-
ing a remittitur or a new trial fit one of the 
seven specified in Rule 59. See Crookston, 
817 P.2d at 804. The pertinent three 
among these grounds include: 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, ap-
pearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justi-
fy the verdict or other decision, or that it 
is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(5)—(7). The trial court 
should review the propriety of the damages 
award and grant a new trial only where it 
is obvious that the jury lacked a reasonable 
basis for its decision, acted with prejudice 
or passion, or disregarded competent evi-
dence. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 803-05. 
On reviewing the decision of the trial 
court to grant or deny a new trial, we do 
not directly review the verdict, ''ignoring 
any intermediate actions by the trial 
court." Id. at 802. Instead we consider 
that " *[w]hen the determination of the jury 
has been submitted to the scrutiny and 
judgment of the trial judge, his [or her] 
action thereon should be regarded as giv-
ing further solidarity to the judgment.'" 
Id. at 806 (quoting Elkington v. Foust, 618 
P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980)). We, therefore, 
will reverse "the judge's ultimate decision 
to grant or deny a new trial, . . . only if 
there is no reasonable basis for that deci-
sion," id. at 805, resolving any doubt in 
favor of the trial court, id. at 806. 
Because the insurance contract between 
plaintiffs and defendant was cancelled 
when defendant offered to reimburse plain-
tiffs for the repairs necessitated by fire 
damage to their home, plaintiffs based 
their claim against defendant on promisso-
ry estoppel. Promissory estoppel may be 
invoked in circumstances where " 'equity 
recognizes the unfairness of permitting 
withdrawal of the promise and will enforce 
i t ' " Tolboe, 682 P.2d at 846 (quoting Un-
ion Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Bros., 15 Utah 
2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1964)). The 
necessary elements of promissory estoppel 
include: "(1) a promise reasonably expect-
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ed to induce reliance; (2) reasonable reli-
ance inducing action or forbearance on the 
part of the promisee or a third person; and 
(3) detriment to the promisee or third per-
son." Weese v. Davis County Comm'n, 
834 P.2d 1, 4 n. 17 (Utah 1992) (emphasis 
added). Utah has also adopted the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts section 90 
describing promissory estoppel as follows: 
" 'A promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or for-
bearance on the part of the promisee or a 
third person and which does induce such 
action or forbearance is binding if injustice 
can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise. The remedy granted for breach 
may be limited as justice requires.' " Tol* 
boe, 682 P.2d at 845 (quoting Restatement 
(Second) Contracts § 90(1) (1981)). 
The factual prerequisites for promissory 
estoppel are: 
"that the defendants were aware of all 
the material facts; that in such aware-
ness they made the promise when they 
knew that the plaintiff was acting in 
reliance on it; that the latter, observing 
reasonable care and prudence, acted in 
reliance on the promise and got into a 
position where it suffered a loss." 
Id. at 845-46 (emphasis deleted) (quoting 
Union Tank Car, 387 P.2d at 1003). 
Defendant argues that when the facts of 
plaintiffs' case are compared to the essen-
tial promissory estoppel elements, they are 
insufficient to justify plaintiffs' recovery. 
Although defendant concedes the presence 
of a clear promise and does not challenge 
the reasonableness of plaintiffs' reliance on 
that promise, it claims that plaintiffs de-
serve no recovery because either (1) plain-
tiffs did not do anything as a result of the 
promise that they would not have done 
1. Earlier Utah cases had adopted the former 
Restatement of Contracts section 90 (1932) 
which reads as follows: " 'A promise which the 
promisor should reasonably expect to induce 
action or forbearance of a definite and substan-
tial character on the part of the promisee and 
which does induce such action or forbearance is 
binding if injustice can be avoided only by en-
forcement of the promise.'" Southeastern 
Equip. Co. v. Mauss, 696 P.2d 1187, 1188 n. 1 
(Utah 1985) (emphasis added). During the peri-
od of time that this first Restatement provided 
without the promise, or (2) plaintiffs' ex-
penses merit no compensation because they 
provided a benefit and, accordingly, caused 
no detriment to plaintiffs. Thus, according 
to defendant, plaintiffs' damages were the 
result of the fire, not defendant's promise, 
and plaintiffs benefitted from the repairs 
and replacements. For these reasons, de-
fendant asserts that plaintiffs failed to 
prove entitlement to damages. Defendant 
also asserts that even if plaintiffs proved 
an entitlement to damages, they provided 
insufficient evidence from which to calcu-
late damages. 
Utah's appellate courts have not focused 
on the claims asserted by appellant. How-
ever, Utah's adoption of the Restatement 
(Second) version of section 90 does provide 
useful guidance for considering these is-
sues.1 The Restatement (Second) infused a 
more flexible approach into both the sub-
stantive and remedial aspects of promisso-
ry estoppel. John D. Calamari & Joseph 
M. Perillo, Contracts, § 6-1 at 273 n. 19 
(3rd ed. 1987) (discussing Restatement (Sec-
ond), Contracts § 90 cmt. b). This modifi-
cation allows for expanded application of a 
promissory estoppel theory and concomi-
tantly allows remedies consistent with "the 
extent of the reliance." Id. at 273 (empha-
sis added). 
The trial court's Jury Instruction No. 20, 
which was not challenged by either party, 
accurately reflects this flexible concept of 
promissory estoppel: "Damages in promis-
sory estoppel are limited to those which are 
sustained because the plaintiffs have 
changed their position to their detriment in 
reasonable reliance upon the defendant's 
representations. They must have done 
some act which they otherwise would not 
have done. Only acts done in detrimental 
the guidelines for promissory estoppel, Utah 
courts treated the doctrine as a consideration 
substitute, triggering full compensatory dam-
ages, but limited its availability to situations 
where the injury to plaintiffs was so unjust and 
unconscionable as to constitute near fraud, see 
Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332, 
333-35 (1956), or the promisor "manifested an 
intention to abandon an existing right," see Ra-
varino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570, 575 
(1953). 
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reliance are compensable/' While this in-
struction required the jury to limit dam-
ages to those caused by detrimental reli-
ance, it did not require that all the effects 
of plaintiffs' actions be of no benefit to 
them. The instruction is likewise consis-
tent with cases allowing promissory estop-
pel actions to proceed where plaintiffs 
nonetheless benefitted in some fashion 
from acts taken in detrimental reliance on 
the promise of another. For example, in 
Northside Auto Serv. Inc. v. Consumers 
United Ins., 25 Wash.App. 486, 607 P.2d 
890, 892-93 (1980), the court affirmed a 
jury verdict enforcing an insurer's promise 
to pay for the insured's automobile repairs, 
although the insurer later denied policy 
coverage. See also Tynes v. Bankers Life 
Co., 224 Mont 350, 730 P.2d 1115, 1123 
(1986) (upholding a jury finding of promis-
sory estoppel and damages where insurer 
had promised to pay for critically needed 
psychological treatment); Huhtala v. Trav-
elers Ins. Co., 401 Mich. 118, 257 N.W.2d 
640, 647 (1977) (remanding for trial on 
claim that insurer's promise to provide cov-
erage for plaintiffs injuries resulting from 
automobile accident was enforceable). 
[5] Plaintiffs argue, and we agree, that 
a promissory estoppel claim should not fail 
for lack of damages on the sole basis that 
plaintiffs received a benefit. In the cases 
noted, where plaintiffs obtained medical 
treatment or repaired a car, the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel was applied to enforce 
a promise and prevent injustice, as deter-
mined by the factfinder. While the dam-
ages must be limited to those incurred 
through reasonable reliance, the flexible 
and equitable nature of promissory estop-
pel allows for damages even where the 
plaintiff receives a benefit such as im-
proved health, a repaired car, or a repaired 
home. 
[6,7] In our view, plaintiffs presented 
to the jury sufficient evidence to allow the 
jury to determine an entitlement to promis-
2. The written records were ruled inadmissible 
by the trial court, upon defendant's objection. 
Mr. Andreason, however, referred to and re-
freshed his memory from these records 
throughout his testimony. 
sory estoppel damages and to calculate 
their value. An award of damages re-
quires that a plaintiff prove the fact of 
damages by a preponderance of the evi-
dence and the amount of damages by ap-
proximations and projections that rise 
above mere speculation. See Atkin 
Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel., 
709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985). 
Mr. Andreason meticulously testified 
from his personal written records of ex-
penses,2 that the repairs for which he 
sought recovery were undertaken because 
of defendant's representation and would 
not otherwise have been done. Plaintiffs 
followed the adjuster's instructions in 
throwing out water damaged carpet that 
they otherwise might have cleaned, discard-
ing the kitchen stove and cabinets they 
otherwise might have repaired, replacing 
weakened floor joists they might have rein-
forced, and tearing out a burned cedar wall 
and tile floor they might have cleaned and 
left.3 
From this evidence, the jury could rea-
sonably infer that adhering to defendant's 
plan of immediate professional repair re-
quired plaintiffs to forego their option of 
gradual self-help and necessitated addition-
al expenses. Based on this inference, the 
jury could reasonably conclude that plain-
tiffs' actions constituted both a change of 
position and detriment. Defendant's retro-
spective analysis of some beneficial effect 
does not prevent the jury from finding a 
detriment suffered in reliance on defen-
dant's promise and the injustice that would 
occur if the promise were not enforced to 
the extent of reliance. 
As the factfinder in this case, the jury 
also was responsible for assigning a value 
to damages that reflected the extent of 
plaintiffs' detrimental reliance. Plaintiffs 
actually argued that they should be reim-
bursed for the full cost of all the repair 
work done on their fire damaged home 
3. Defendant did not present any expert testimo-
ny of its own as to reasonable repairs or costs, 
but rather elected only to challenge Mr. Andrea-
son's calculations and credibility through cross-
examination. 
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during the three week period because they 
would not have undertaken any of their 
reparative actions without defendant's 
promise of insurance coverage. The evi-
dentiary value and credibility of this asser-
tion were properly subjected to the jury's 
assessment. "[I]n a jury trial, 'it is within 
the exclusive province of the jury to judge 
the credibility of the witness and the 
weight of the evidence/ " State v. Larsen, 
834 P.2d 586, 589 (Utah App.1992) (quoting 
State v. Howell 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 
1982)). Considering the evidence presented 
to the jury, an allocation of approximately 
90% of plaintiffs' expenses as representing 
the extent of damages due to detrimental 
reliance was not contrary to the law. The 
trial court, having observed all evidence 
and testimony, was not persuaded that the 
jury's verdict lacked a reasonable basis, 
was motivated by prejudice or passion, or 
that the jury had disregarded competent 
evidence. Therefore, the trial court did not 
unreasonably deny defendant's motion for 
a new trial or remittitur. 
Prejudgment Interest 
[8] In their cross-appeal, plaintiffs as-
sert that the trial court erred in not award-
ing them prejudgment interest on the 
jury's damages award. The trial courts 
decision on plaintiffs' entitlement to pre-
judgment interest presents a question of 
law whichjve_reviewJ:or_correctness. Vali 
Convalescent & Care Insts. v. Division of 
Health Care Fin., 797 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah 
App.1990); Hermes Assocs. v. Park's 
Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Utah 
App.1991). Consequently, "we need not ac-
cord any particular deference to the deci-
sions below," Vali, 797 P.2d at 444 (citing 
Hurley v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524, 
526-27 (Utah 1988) (agency decision); 
Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 
(Utah 1985) (trial court decision)). 
Plaintiffs argue that by establishing the 
threshold facts of promise, reliance and 
damage, they created an entitlement to full 
compensation for their expenses, including 
interest on the money expended six years 
previously. According to plaintiffs, their 
right to full compensatory damages in-
cludes prejudgment interest as a matter of 
law because (1) their damages were suffi-
ciently fixed at the time that they incurred 
expenses to repair their home, and (2) pre-
judgment interest is appropriate because 
"the damages claimed were with reference 
to the value of the repair of damaged prop-
erty." 
[9-11] The Utah Supreme Court first 
discussed the rationale behind prejudgment 
interest in Fell v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 
32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1005-06 (1907). 
The Fell court stated that because award-
ing damages at law was intended to return 
a plaintiff to the status quo, prejudgment 
interest could be available where necessary 
to accomplish full compensation. Id. Jn 
Utah, prejudgment interest may be award-
ed in situations where the damage is com-
plete, the loss can be measured by facts 
and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed 
as of a particular time. Bjork v. April 
Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 
1977), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct. 
2634, 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977). Although 
damages may be unliquidated, they must 
be calculable through a mathematically cer-
tain procedure allowing the court or the 
jury to fix the amount by following "fixed 
rules of evidence and known standards of 
~ value . . . rather than be[ing] guided by 
their best judgment in assessing the 
amount" or evaluating elements lacking 
fixed standards by which to measure their 
value.. Fell, 88 P. at 1007; Price-Orem v. 
Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, 784 P.2d 475, 
483 (Utah App.1989). Insufficient certain-
ty exists, courts should allow interest from 
the time when damages became fixed, rath-
er than from the date of the judgment. 
Bjork, 560 P.2d at 317. However, "where 
^damages are incomplete and are peculiarly 
within the province of the jury to assess at 
Ihetime of trial,' " then prejudgment inter-
est is inappropriate. Price-Orem, 784 P.2d 
at 483 (quoting Fell, 88 P. at 1006). 
[12] Plaintiffs argue that the amount of 
their expenditures to repair the property 
damage caused by the fire determined their 
damages and that their conscientious and 
credible recording of repair expenses creat-
ed the necessary mathematical certainty. 
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We find, however, that while plaintiffs' re-
cordation of expenses may accurately re-
flect the value of their personal expendi-
tures, it does not provide a known standard 
of value for measuring damages in a prom-
issory estoppel case. Instead, damage as-
sessment based on the Restatement (Sec-
ond) version of promissory estoppel re-
quires a factfinder's case by case calcula-
tion of the value of detrimental reliance on 
a promise. Furthermore, "[t]he remedy 
granted may be limited as justice re-
quires/' Restatement (Second) Contracts 
§ 90(1) (1981)/ Damages, therefore, do not 
become fixed before a factfinder quantifies 
the injustice caused by detrimental reli-
ance. In assessing this amount, the fact-
finder is guided by its best judgment, not a 
known standard of value. 
We also disagree with plaintiffs' asser-
tion that prejudgment interest is particular-
ly appropriate because their claim refers to 
the repair of property damage. Unlike the 
case before us, in the cases cited by plain-
tiffs, courts awarding prejudgment interest 
found defendants responsible for actual 
damage to the plaintiffs' property under 
tort theories. See Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. 
White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885, 887 
(Utah 1976) (finding contractor's negli-
gence in setting up a natural gas compres-
sor station responsible for the fire which 
completely destroyed it); Fell, 88 P. at 
1003-07 (finding that the railroad's delay in 
shipment caused the death of some of 
plaintiffs sheep and the weight loss in 
others). Under circumstances where a de-
fendant was directly responsible for the 
property damage, courts have found "no 
question about the propriety of allowing 
interest for the destruction of personal 
property prior to judgment where value 
can be measured by facts and figures." 
Uinta, 546 P.2d at 887 (discussing Fell). 
In this case, however, we note that de-
fendant did not directly cause any harm to 
plaintiffs' property. The fire caused the 
property damage; defendant only impacted 
plaintiffs' method of repairing pre-existing 
4. The Price-Orem court found that a developer 
was not entitled to prejudgment interest against 
his surveyor because the amount of damage for 
which defendant was responsible was too specu-
property damage. Furthermore, in con-
trast to a tort action for property damage, 
the recovery properly awarded under a 
promissory estoppel theory reflects the ex-
tent of reliance. To separate the damage 
for which defendant must accept responsi-
bility from expenses which would have oc-
curred in the absence of defendant's prom-
ise requires the determination of a fact-
finder. Factual evaluation of this type 
lacks, mathematical certainty prior to final 
determination and requires case by case 
analysis. When "the amount of the dam-
age must be ascertained and assessed by 
the trier of the fact at the trial/' prejudg-
. ment interest is inappropriate. Price-
Orem, 784 P.2d at 4824 (quoting Bjork, 
560 P.2d at 317). 
We, therefore, find that the trial court 
properly refused to allow plaintiffs pre-
judgment interest on a jury award based 
on promissory estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
In developing promissory estoppel as an 
equitable cause of action, Utah has incorpo-
rated flexibility into both the elements of 
the substantive doctrine and the measure 
of its reliance remedy. A finding that 
promissory estoppel is applicable requires 
the factfinder to determine the plaintiff's 
recovery by calculating the portion of total 
expenses reflecting actual, detrimental reli-
ance. In upholding the promissory estop-
pel award determined by the jury, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion. We also 
find that the trial court correctly denied 
pre-judgment interest on that award. 
Affirmed. 
BILLINGS, J., concurs. 
ORME, J., concurs in result only. 
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No. It was insufficient to pay all of our bills 
three months after Mark and I purchased the store. 
Mr. Van Alstyne, you testified that you did not 
with Mr. Walsh about the sale of the business 









You did not confer with him then concerning the 
F down of the business and the sale of the assets? 
Oh, I had earlier. I had earlier. 
Well, that was prior to his selling to Ms. Ericksoi 
wasn't it? 
After he had reported to me that he had, that he 
was walking out. 
Q 
to Ms. 
But you did testify that you did in fact report 
Erickson the full terms of the sale of the assets of 










The full terms of the sale of the assets? 
Yes. In the spring. 
Like May, '86? 
'86. 
Right. I did. 
And did you in fact distribute to her some of the 
assets of the partnership? 
Right. 
Were any of the unsold assets of the partnership 
46 

























Then they referred me to Helen Hooper, who listed the 
business. Then they had a meeting with my attorney and her 
attorney. And I believe, I think—and I may be wrong, but 
I think Mr. Walsh was there. But my attorney told them 
that this store is listed on the market to be sold. And 
we also had an appraisal price. 
Q That was the extent of your informing Jude 
Erickson all along the way? 
A Well, no. Oh, we kept her posted. I sent her, 
I think twice, well, maybe more than once, but twice, a 
letter telling her what is happening. 
Q Why did you send her a letter and she wasn't an 
employee any more? 
A Well, again, she kept, you know, they were going 
to sue me. You know, she had--she was working with an 
attorney who was coming after me on the grounds alleging 
that I am preventing her from her rights in this video 
business, and about—good heavens, just trying to stay 
alive. 
Q Okay. Then when you finally sold it the following 
June of '86, you said that you didn't sell all the assets, 
that some of the assets you kept and some you gave to 
Erickson. 





 buy. They could not use them. 
2 Q What were they? 
3 A Well, there was a T.V. and then some Beta movies 
4
 that were damaged, and a video camera that was broken. And 
5 i think a cash register and some office supplies. Those, I 
6 gave to Jude. We purchased two video recorders. 
7
 Q Who is "we"? 
8 A My wife and I. So, we made out a check and 
9 J purchased the two video recorders. I took the T.V., 
because the video store had purchased out of my own pocket 
and I paid a carpet cleaning bill earlier that spring. 
12 And I reimbursed myself for that with some other supplies. 
1
^ Q Let's move on to the proceeds from this contract 
14
 of sale in June, f86, with Video U.S.A. 
1
^ I A Uh huh (affirmative) 
Q Who received those proceeds? 
17
 | A Well, Gerald and I. 
18 I U The reason I'm asking is, I heard Mr. Crawley 
19 I ask you, said Robinson had gotten all of the proceeds from 
that; is that true? 
A Well, I'm sorry, no. I've taken Gerald and I've 
split them. I used my proceeds to pay my legal costs 
since Mark initiated this action against me. 






25 how much a month? 
122 
1 Q Which were what? Were they your personal books? 
2 I mean, which ones? 
3 A Right. These are different. 
4 Q Which one is right, this one or the one Mary Ann 
5 prepared? 
6 A I prepared this just as a general ballpark when 
7 I was consulting with you as to what at the very least would} 
8 be the outstanding debt that I am in the hole, out these 
9 dollar amounts. At the very least. I didn't really work 
10 into any consideration with respect to interest accrueing 
11 there. I was just trying to get a general idea. 
12 MS. MAUGHAN: Thank you. That's all. 
13 THE COURT: Any questions? 
14 MR. CRAWLEY: No questions. 
15 THE COURT: All right. You may step down. 
16 Anything further? 
17 MS. MAUGHAN: No. 
18 THE COURT: Defense rests? 
19 MS. MAUGHAN: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: All right. As I indicated in 
21 chambers and at the request of the parties, we will take 
22 final argument in the form of simultaneous submitted 
23 memorandums. And I would like, in that regard, your 
24 specific input as to the questions I raised, those being 
25 mutual mistake of law in relation to the Walsh/Erickson 
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been sold there. 
I I would like your road map. I think it's, as I 
4
 ' said in chambers, it's fairly clear as to the position of 
5 the plaintiff in relation to the relief sought. I'm not 
* now that clear in relation to the dollars and cents on the 
' I claim for relief under the counterclaim, because the 
evidence has altered it somewhat from the claims as set 
forth in the pleadings. But as to the plaintiff's claim 
that there is a change or alteration in those figures, I 
would like there to be all the evidence out and in the 
open to tell me what our bottom line is. 
Both counsel can see the conflict in the evidence 
as well as I can. Please comment on it and tell me what 
you think I ought to believe and why, and any case 
citations you have, would you set them forth. I would be 
17
 J glad to look them up, or if you want to set forth pertinent 
quotes and again, give me four cases on one point as an 
irrascib le and inflated jurist used to say, just give me 
your best case. And that's the only thing he ever did tha 
I liked him for. Everything else then, he was not much of 
a jurist, but that's all right. 
Anything further then this afternoon? 
24
 MR. CRAWLEY: What date? 
THE COURT: You want to pick a date? Let's see, 
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